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Abstract
Applications of formal methods for state space exploration have been successfully applied to
evaluate robust critical software systems. Formal methods enable discovery of error conditions
that conventional testing may miss, and can aid in planning complex system operations. However,
broad application of formal methods has been hampered by the effort required to generate formal
specifications for real systems. In this paper we present State Linked Interface Compliance Engine for
Data (SLICED), a methodology that addresses the complexity of formal state machine specification
generation by leveraging conventional engineering models to derive compositional formal state models
and to generate formal assertions on the state machines. We demonstrate SLICED using the Virtual
ADAPT model published by NASA and validate our results by replicating them using Simulink.
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1 Introduction
Formal methods for system verification, particularly via model checking have been in use since
the 1980s. A common use of model checking is to create a representation of the system under
analysis as a Finite State Machine (FSM) with assertions to be verified written in temporal
logic. A model checker is then used to evaluate the FSM against the temporal logic assertions,
providing counterexamples for any assertions for which an exception exists. Several strategies
have been developed for representing and exploring finite state machines, notably symbolic
model checking, which represents sets of states as Boolean functions. Exploration of these
functions can be accomplished via Binary Decision Diagram (BDD) manipulation, which
treats the state model exploration as a graph traversal, or by Bounded Model Checking (BMC),
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1 INTRODUCTION
which treats bounded length executions of the state model as a SATISFIABILITY (SAT)
problems [5].
A detailed survey of the practice of model checking is beyond the scope of this paper
(See [5] for an overview). However, a theme in model checking methodologies encountered by
the authors is the need to translate or adapt one’s system design to an FSM with temporal
logic assertions. Many such system designs are already written as conventional engineering
models (e.g., AADL, SysML, Simulink). 1 The SLICED methodology outlined in this paper
provides a framework for generation of an FSM and associated assertions from conventional
engineering models, as well as recommendations for addressing scalability concerns associated
with the analysis of large engineering models.
Background
SLICED originated as an analysis methology for generating FSM and temporal logic assertions
from Architecture Analysis and Design Language (AADL). AADL is a language for describing
embedded software systems in semantically precise terms [1]. SLICED has subsequently
evolved to also include generation of FSMs and temporal logic assertions from SysML and
Simulink. SLICED relies on well-defined component archetypes to generate standardized
behavior FSM for individual system components that can be assembled into a composite
FSM (see Definition 1).
I Definition 1. A component’s significant states are states that affect or are affected by
other components. In the context of SLICED, a component’s behavior is a specification
of its significant states, how external events affect its active significant state, and how its
significant states or transitions between significant states affect other components.
Advanced Diagnostic and Prognostic Testbed (ADAPT) is a testbed for evaluating
electrical systems and injecting faults in a controlled manner. ADAPT consists of a power
supply, batteries, sensors, and actuators. ADAPT has several hundred components [20].
NASA created Virtual ADAPT to provide a digital equivalent of ADAPT. Virtual ADAPT
is a Simulink model of the majority of ADAPT [21].
We exercise the SLICED methodology using the symbolic model checker NuSMV. NuSMV
provides the ability to specify Modules, which are collections of variables and transitions
analogous to subcomponents in a system design [11].
Scope
This paper describes the SLICED methodology and how it applies to the Virtual ADAPT
source model. We provide examples of the generated FSM as specified in the Symbolic
Model Verification (SMV) language. We provide performance metrics generated from running
the NuSMV solver on our generated FSM. We conclude with recommendations for future
research.
1 For the purpose of this paper, conventional engineering models are structured models that follow
a well-defined semantic structure and describe stateful system components, but that do not explicitly
provide FSMs or only provide FSMs specific components.
NAVAIR Public Release 2020-113. Distribution Statement A - “Approved for public release;
distribution is unlimited.”
2 MOTIVATION
Figure 1 Costs of incompatibilities over the lifetime of a project [22] [15] [3].
2 Motivation
Software Integration Cost
Software integration is a major cost driver in avionics development. Integration problems
often go undetected until late in the development process, when the impact to cost and
schedule to fix such issues is much higher (as shown in Figure 1).
Limitations of Current Approaches
A variety of efforts in recent years have leveraged Model Based Systems Engineering (MBSE)
to reduce the risk of software integration, such as Future Airborne Capability Environment
(FACE) [16]. These efforts have garnered industry momentum toward modeling as a key
element of systems engineering. However, system faults associated with the underspecified
behavior of integrated components remain problematic. For example, in 1999 the Mars Polar
Lander is believed to have crashed because of unspecified behavior of Hall Effect sensors
on its landing legs [18]. The behavior was known to the landing leg engineers, but was
not communicated to the software engineers. Integrated system behavior can also manifest
in more subtle errors, such as timing errors in software integration due to inconsistent
communication paradigm assumptions in software components found in a recent U.S. Army
Study [8].
Formal modeling of component behavior has potential to address these issues. Formal
modeling of the Mars Polar Lander landing legs could have communicated the legs behavior
and enabled automated detection of integration errors in the interaction between the landing
legs and software. Formal analysis can uncover unlikely system configurations that may be
difficult to evaluate using conventional testing methods. However, there are two significant
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Figure 2 ADAPT components, with components modeled in Virtual ADAPT highlighted.
factors that complicate application of formal methods that must be addressed before formal
methods can be viable in avionics systems engineering workflows. First, formal methods are
outside of the expertise of many systems engineers. Although training can bridge this gap,
tools and methodologies that reduce the effort required to employ formal methods could
provide a low-cost-high-return alternative to extensive training. Second, current applications
of formal methods analysis are not geared toward integration of components from different
organizations or teams.
Contributions of this Paper
The objective of this SLICED project is to make formal methods capabilities accessible to
systems engineers by leveraging existing formal methods tools, MBSE environments, and
models. This paper describes how SLICED addresses two core limitations of the state of
art using a compositional approach to formulating formal methods specifications in terms of
standardized component architetypes and a methodology for generating formal specifications
and assertions from conventional engineering models. This paper also explores methods
for creating formal assertions to check both for potential error conditions and to generate
plans for error recovery. This paper describes a case study demonstrating a novel approach
translating a Simulink model to modularized NuSMV state machine specifications. This
paper uses the NASA Virtual ADAPT model for evaluation. The overall architecture for
ADAPT and the elements implemented in Virtual ADAPT are shown in Figure 2 from [21].
Our approach in SLICED is based on the Architecture-Centric Virtual Integration
Process (ACVIP). ACVIP provides early detection of integration errors through model
integration [9]. Our first automated implementation of the SLICED methodology was based
on AADL, which provides a lexicon for clearly and consistently describing embedded software
components [1]. The most common language for ACVIP modeling is AADL, which is an
embedded computing systems modeling language. Although the approach described in this
paper does not use AADL directly (ADAPT is provided by NASA in Simulink, not AADL),
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the component prototypes used to establish interface boundaries in ADAPT (e.g., battery
and relay) are defined with intent and granularity informed by types in AADL (e.g., thread
and bus). Simulink models provide a test platform for simulation-based evaluation. SLICED
takes a Simulink model, abstracts the inner complexity of its components, creates an FSM,
and evaluates that FSM to generate scenarios for evaluation via simulation.
The notation in this paper follows that used by Biere et al. who describe an FSM as a
Kripke structure M = (S, I, T, L) and
S is a set of states.
I is a set of initial states.
T is a set of transitions between states.
L is a labeling of states with atomic propositions that hold in each state.
A path pi in this structure is a sequence of states representing on execution of the system
[5].
Research Hypotheses
There is an inherent loss of fidelity that occurs when tranlating from a highly detailed
Simulink model to a abstract behavior model. This loss is acceptable because the objective
of SLICED is not to perform a precise simulation of the system (Simulink already does that);
rather, the objective of SLICED is to generate scenarios that can be evaluated using precise
simulation. Claim 2 states this notion formally. There are error conditions that SLICED
may not find, but those it does find are replicatable in Simulink. 2
B Claim 2. Let P be a source model in some language that can be executed or simulated.
Let R be the set of system states possible in P and r in R be a single system state. Let M
be a Kripke model decomposed from P. A faithful decomposed of P to M will yield a set of
states S in which each state s maps to one or more states r in R. A path pi on M is called
replicable if there exists a sequence of states Φ in R for which each state sn maps to one or
more states rj...k and sn+1 maps to one or more states rj+1...k. An error path pi found in a
FSM generated by decomposition from M is replicable via simulation or execution of P.
3 Related Work
Related Work on Component Interoperability
The need to modularize software and hardware development to foster interoperability has
driven a variety of research and standardization efforts. Notably, the FACE Technical
Standard standardizes the concept of a Unit of Portability, a software component whose
interface is defined using a standardized modeling language [16]. The well-defined boundary
of FACE Units of Portability enables compositional analysis earlier than would otherwise be
possible [25]. Similarly, the Hardware Open Systems Technologies (HOST) standard defines
an approach for modular hardware components [14].
2 “Error” as used in Claim 2 and throughout this paper refers to a deviation from a desired system state
[2].
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Related Work on Application of Formal Methods
A variety of efforts have explored the potential of formal methods application to avionics
engineering. The Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) High-Assurance
Cyber Military Systems (HACMS) project successfully generated code from a formally
verified model of assume-guarantee contracts [13]. The HACMS project used a tool called
Assume Guarantee Reasoning Environment (AGREE) developed by Collins Aerospace that
generates formal, invariant-oriented specifications from AADL models. AGREE generates
the formal specification from the model, but is not capable of reasoning about infinite
time conditions and requires that the user explicitly state assumptions and guarantees
about system conditions. Vestal describes application of finite state automata to embedded
software scheduling [27]. Boddy et al. generated a processor schedule using a formal problem
specification derived from an AADL model [7]. Boddy’s approach treats existing properties
in an AADL model such as periodic thread deadlines as constraints and uses them to express
a scheduling problem in terms of constraints derived from the model.
Related Work on Model Checking
This paper uses NuSMV, a symbolic model cheker that supports Linear Temporal Logic (LTL)
and Computation Tree Logic (CTL) model checking [11]. A variety of prior efforts use NuSMV.
For example, Szpyrka et al. describe a process for generating NuSMV specifications from
Petri Nets [26]. Most closely related to this project, Meenakshi et al describe a similar
methodology for translating Simulink models to NuSMV in [19]. However, the methodology
described by Meenakshi et al is focused on naive NuSMV generation from a given Simulink
model.
Related Work on Compositional State Modeling
Ranganath et al. described an approach to modeling communication patterns of medical
devices [24]. Ranganath’s approach aims to reduce the compotational burden of reasoning
about integrated systems by abstracting details behind standardized interfaces. Beurdouche
et al. used a compositional approach to modeling the state of Transport Layer Security (TLS)
communication, creating a composite state machine by assembling state machines of individual
components [4].
SLICED as Associated to Related Work
The aim of SLICED and the focus on this paper is on generation of abstract, interoperable
specifications to allow formal analysis of systems composed of models from multiple parties.
SLICED is an extension of the interface specification approaches of FACE and HOST
with an aim of enabling analysis akin to that performed by Beurdouche. SLICED uses a
modularization approach similar to the communication patterns described by Ranganath,
abstracting the patterns into standardized components akin to those specified by AADL.
4 System Model
SLICED takes a compositional approach to state modeling, requiring that the user provide
state machine specifications for each component that describe its behavior as manifest at its
logical boundary. Applied to a Simulink model, this means the user treats individual blocks
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Figure 3 Battery 1 in the ADAPT model. SLICED treats the battery as a black box, tracking
only the fault status of the battery and the power draw.
(e.g., a battery) as black boxes, describing their behavior only in terms of what goes in to
the component and what comes out.
For the ADAPT example application of SLICED, we defined five types of components,
each with behavior specified at their boundary. Doing so enabled us to abstract the inner
complexity of the components, losing model fidelity but enabling formal analysis. Listing 1
shows an example of a SLICED module abstracting the Simulink specification shown in
Figure 3. The states listed in Listing 1 are taken from a secondary specification provided by
NASA with the ADAPT model. 3
1 MODULE Battery ( output1 , output2 , capac i ty )
2 VAR
3 s t a t e : {nominal , dead , underRepair } ;
4 DEFINE
5 supplyingPower := ( s t a t e = nominal ) ;
6 draw := ( output1 . draw + output1 . draw ) ;
7 ASSIGN
8 in i t ( s t a t e ) := nominal ;
9
10 next ( s t a t e ) := case
11 ( draw > capac i ty ) : dead ;
12 ( ( s t a t e = dead ) & (draw = 0) ) : underRepair ;
13 ( ( s t a t e = underRepair ) & (draw = 0) ) : nominal ;
14 TRUE : s t a t e ;
15 esac ;
Listing 1 Battery module specified in NuSMV
SLICED combines these state specifications with global system configuration (such as
processor schedules, message routing, or indercomponent dependencies) to create a composite
state machine (this data flow is shown in Figure 4).
I Definition 3. A composite state machine is a deterministic finite automata formed from
the powerset construction of independent component state machines and system configuration.
By limiting the scope of each component’s state machine to its behavioral interface,
SLICED can minimize the effective state space that it must analyze. The limited scope of
3 https://github.com/nasa/VirtualADAPT/blob/master/MATLAB/ADAPTComponents.m
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Figure 4 SLICED Architecture
each component’s state machine reduces the risk required to reconfigure an integrated system
design, for example by adding or removing components as shown in Subsubsection 6.3.1,
because the connections between components are well defined and clearly specified. A
naive deterministic finite automata construction from multiple state machines results in the
powerset construction of all of their component states, as described in Definition 3. Our
definition of the composite state machine is similar to the Interface Featured Time Automata
described by Cledou et al. [12].
A core element of the SLICED hypothesis is that discretized events in a system model
can yield results that are useful for a real system. Use of a discrete clock enables us to model
timed automata (strictly, ordered automata) where assumptions about the duration of events
can be applied. A further branch of study, the application of statistical methods to timed
automata, is beyond the scope of this paper.
Approaches to Finite State Machine Generation
There are several potential levels of fidelity in translation of an electrical systems model
(such as Virtual ADAPT) to a formal specification. All of these approaches treat individual
components as black boxes and construct a formal specification as an assembly of black-box
modeled components. Each level adds fidelity to the black box models, progressively them
from “black” to “white.”
1. State only translation: Make no assumptions about the relationships between com-
ponents. Model component states only as expressed verbatim in the source model.
2. State and connection translation: Assume that error states propagate along com-
munication paths described in the source model. Assume some source model states are
“good” and some are “bad” and that good and bad state properties propagate (e.g., if a
component is in a bad state, anything connected to it is also in a bad state).
3. State and connection translation with directionality: Same as State and Connec-
tion Translation, but assume directionality in connections can be determined from the
source model (that is, bad component state only propagates to downstream components.)
This assumes that cycles are allowed, but that connections are directed.
4. State and connection translation with directionality and discrete signals: In-
stead of treating connections as binary on/off, treat connections as capable of holding
one of a fixed set of values (e.g., value from 0. . . 9).
5. Discrete models of component behavior: Model the internals of each component
in the model, discretizing and bounding the values but otherwise fully translating its
behavior to a formal specification.
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SLICED Pseudocode
SLICED employs approach 4, State and connection translation with directionality
and discrete signals:. This is in contrast with the higher-fidelity translation presented by
Meenakshi et al. [19]. The SLICED implementation is similar for most modeling languages
(prior implementations have used AADL and SysML). The SLICED implementation for
ADAPT and Simulink is as follows:
1. Iterate over all elements in the simulink model (using the library org.conqat.lib.simulink 4)
in a depth-first search.
2. For each leaf block, identify the archetype of the block (e.g., relay, battery, junction).
Create a new MODULE in SMV for that block using a standard prototype.
a. The ADAPT Simulink model does not define component archtetypes, so we relied
on component naming conventions to differentiate components. For future work an
AADL model of ADAPT could enable stronger semantic consistency in component
definitions.
3. As the search ascends toward the root, continue creating MODULES for each block that
has a corresponding archetype.
4. For each line contained in each block, add input or output parameters to the appropriate
modules based on the start and end points of each line. This step is similar to the process
of creating Reo connectors described in [12].
5. For each line that traverses multiple blocks, follow the line until a SLICED-abstracted
component is found. When the SLICED-abstracted component is found, add it as an
input or an output parameter as described in the previous step.
4.1 Subsystem Merging
An additional performance improvement strategy employed by SLICED is problem reduction
based on effective communication. In software state analysis, SLICED uses intercomponent
communication configuration to limit the size of the composite state machine by excluding
composite states that are not reachable using a given communication configuration, similar
to the “port linking” approach described by Cledou et al. [12]. As with Cledou et al., we
treat all signals uniformly (that is, in a hardware model a component’s power draw is treated
as a form of communication with the component supplying the power). SLICED uses a
stragety similar to Shannon’s expansion to reduce the complexity of hardware model FSMs
[17]. This paper focuses on the latter, as it is most applicable to the ADAPT model.
4.1.1 Subsystem Merging in ADAPT
In the ADAPT model there are four banks of actuators, two with two actuators and two
with six actuators. Using our actuator module definition (Listing 2), this results in 16 total
actuators, each with 3 states, increasing our effective state space by a factor of 316. However,
inspection of the model shows that the effective communication between the each bank of
actuators and the batteries and relays all goes through a single connection (e.g., the breaker
EY166 in Figure 5). The result is that there are a considerable numbers of composite states
of the actuators that can be discarded a priori by collapsing the state space of six actuators
into a single effective actuator state, shown in Listing 3, whose states are limited to the
4 https://www.cqse.eu/en/products/simulink-library-for-java/overview/
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available effective states of the subsystem. In the case of the breaker, EY166, there are 36
possible states when the subsystem is considered naively, but there are only 13 effective
states of its interaction with other components (each actuator can draw 0, 1, or 2 units of
power. There are 6 actuators, so power consumption of 0..12 is possible (thus drawlimit is
set to 12 in Listing 3).
1 MODULE Actuator ( input )
2 VAR
3 s t a t e : {nominal , nopower , f au l t yRe s i s t an c e } ;
4 DEFINE
5 draw := case
6 ( ! ( input . supplyingPower ) | ( s t a t e = nopower ) ) : 0 ;
7 ( s t a t e = nominal ) : 1 ;
8 ( s t a t e = f au l t yRe s i s t an c e ) : 2 ;
9 esac ;
10 ASSIGN
11 in i t ( s t a t e ) := nominal ;
12
Listing 2 Actuator module specified in NuSMV
1 MODULE MergedActuator ( input , drawl imit )
2 VAR
3 draw : 0 . . drawl imit ;
4
Listing 3 Merged Actuator module specified in NuSMV
4.1.2 Subsystem Merging Formalism
In terms of Shannon’s expansion, we divide the system problem into two sub-problems at
the boundary of the connection between the system and the parent system. This divide
is possible because of the compositional structure of the FSM. Subsystems that interact
only at the subsystem boundary (abstracting their inner components) must define functions
that aggregate their internal state (such as the addition of power consumption described in
Subsubsection 4.1.1). Dependencies between components are modeled as shared variables
in the FSM. For example, the power draw of an actuator is represented as an integer
variable that is shared with upstream relays, breakers, or power supplies. This approach
to reduced subsystem representation is similar to the Cone of Influence (COI) feature of
NuSMV, however COI only eliminates variables not reachable from a given assertion [10].
BMC analysis of the state model may likely have taken advantage of this feature of the
model and is an opportunity for future study.
Any resulting error trace (for example, a error when the total draw is 10) can serve as
input to a follow-up sub-analysis on the decomposed subsystem. The error trace for the
top level error will give us the value on the communication channel between the top level
system and the sub-system, which we then use to generate a second assertion, this time
on the sub-system. Because the only interaction between the sub-system and the top level
system is through the aggregation component, we can be confident that none of the 36 - 13
state combinations in the sub-system could have altered our top level assessment.
4.2 Assertion Generation
SLICED deals with two classes of assertions over the same problem space, both are classical
applications of temporal logical applied by generation from conventional engineering mod-
els. First, SLICED generates error discovery assertions, which are assertions for which a
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counterexample indicates a system specificaiton error. Error discovery assertions include
those asserting that the system will not enter a bad state from a good state (safety) or
that some expected state will eventually occur (liveness). SLICED can also generate path
discovery assertions, which are assertions that the system will not enter a good state from a
bad state. The former is useful for detecting potential system error conditions. The latter is
useful for generating plans to restore a safe system state if a bad state has occurred.
I Definition 4. An Error Discovery Assertion defines a condition to be avoided, such as
“the system shall never enter an unsafe state.” A “solution” found by the solver for an error
discovery assertion assertion indicates an error in the design.
I Definition 5. A Path Discovery Assertion defines a condition to be reached if possible. A
“solution” found by the solver for a path discovery assertion indicates a plan for return to a
good state.
Safety and Liveness Assertion Generation
Failure assertions include both safety assertions (describing things that should not happen)
and liveness assertions (describing things that should happen). SLICED generates assertions
using information provided by the source model describing the expected states of each
component. For example, when dealing with software components SLICED generates liveness
assertions for periodic threads that must always reach a final state. Similarly, if the source
model definition of a component describes an error state, SLICED generates a safety assertion
that the error state will never be reached.
When evaluating timing properties, SLICED uses a cyclic clock, incrementing one tick
for each step taken in the state machine evaluation. Ticks are represented at the Greatest
Common Denominator (GCD) of timing properties of the design (e.g., for a system which
expresses performance deadlines at a granularity of one millisecond, sliced uses one millisecond
for a tick). SLICED uses a cyclic clock because all variables in a FSM must be finite. The
maximum value of the clock is determined by the hyperperiod of all periodic elements in
the source model (e.g., if the source model has threads with periods of 100, 200, and 300ms,
SLICED will use a 600ms clock cycle). When the source model provides deadlines for
performance, SLICED evaluates the component states against its cyclic clock.
For connections between components, SLICED treats each connection as a discrete
variable or as a property of an existing variable. For connections with capacity constraints,
SLICED treats the connection as a counting semaphore and creates assertions that restrict
the number of messages it can contain according to its upper bound.
Path Discovery Assertion Generation
To generate a path discovery assertion, SLICED expresses the initial (failed) state of the
system in a FSM with its initial state set to include one or more errors. The FSM differs
from that used to evaluate error discovery assertions because it leaves user actions specified
as non-deterministic, in effect letting the solver take on the role of the user to manipulate
the system at-will. In the FSM a user action is a is a transition whose guard relies on a
user input event (e.g., flipping of a switch) where the source of that event is external to the
modeled system. SLICED then generates an assertion describing the negation of the desired
state, including both the original faulty component and of all of the other components in the
system.
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4.2.1 SLICED Formalism
For each component in the source model, we generate a state machine ψ. Using actions A
on or between these components as specified in the source model (e.g., as connections), we
assemble a composite state machine Ψ.
State machine semantics
The formal semantics of a state machine in SLICED are a 6-tuple ψ = (S,A, T ⊆ σ⊕ψ⊕A, s0 ∈
ψ,E ⊆ ψ, d ∈ S).
A—is a set of events, or Actions,
S—is a set of states for the component,
T ⊆ σ
⊕
σ
⊕
A—is the set of labeled transitions,
s0 ∈ S—is a designated initial state,∏
⊆ Σ—is a distinguished set of error states.
We use a shorthand for transitions of S, writing s a→ s′ for an element t ∈ T .
Composite State Machine
The composite state machine is built from both the behavioral model associated with each
component and connections between them. The composite state machine is the analytic core
of SLICED and describes the behavior of the entire system.
Formally, the composite state machine is a timed Büchni automaton built by viewing
each component as running independently with the addition of a global clock. In the case
of ADAPT, which does not have specific timing constraints used by SLICED, SLICED
assumes events happen in discrete time steps. Transitions between states are inter-component
connections, supporting human-in-the-loop state changes through non-determinism. For
example, user-settable relays have non-deterministic open and closed state transitions to
account for user actions. Using powerset construction, we can build a Deterministic Finite
Automata (DFA) to model the behavior of the entire system [23]. In the context of a Simulink
model, a transition is an event that changes the significant state of a component as defined
by its component archetype. The naïve powerset construction is exponentially larger than
the Nondeterministic Finite Automata (NFA) for any individual component.
Formally, given a collection of input n behavioral state machines ψ1, · · ·ψn, using a
common data model A, denoted ψi = (Si, A, T i ⊆ σi⊕Si⊕A, si0 ∈ S,Ei ⊆ S, d ∈ S), the
composite state machine is constructed as:
Ψ = (⊕ψi)⊕A
c = a clock
T =

(· · · , s, · · · ) a→ (· · · , s′, · · · ) for s a→ s′ a transition of Si
and S a time slice of Si

s0 = (s10, s20, . . . , sn0 , S0) ∈ Ψ
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State Space Size
The full state space of the naïve composite state machine for a model the scale of ADAPT is
combinatorially large, making it impractical to analyze. By using component abstractions
with simplified behavior specifications, SLICED dramatically reduces the size of the relevant
state space.
We achieve further reduction in the state space size by using subsystem aggregation
functions table to collapse large subsystem state spaces for top-level system analysis, then
expand them to generate detailed traces for particular conditions.
5 Evaluation Model
Virtual ADAPT
Virtual ADAPT is a Simulink formulation of a physical testbed representing a spacecraft’s
electrical power system. It allows for the injection of faults such as malfunctioning relays
and sudden spikes in electrical resistance so that the system’s response can be studied.
Users can interact with Virtual ADAPT in real time through the GUI flippable switches or
programmatic alteration of most model parameters.
Simulink models are represented as .mdl files which define a hierarchical structure of
components and the connections between them through notions of subsystems, lines (same
level connections), and ports (cross-level connections). Additionally, Virtual ADAPT includes
MATLAB .m files describing fault states and state-transition logic for relevant components.
Model Statistics
Virtual ADAPT contains 11991 blocks, including the top level block. 5 However, Virtual
ADAPT is a hierarchical model and 73% of those blocks are in the lower 7 of Virtual
ADAPT’s 13 levels of block and sub-block containment (3197 blocks in the top 6 levels). 6
6 Experimentation Evaluation
6.1 Experiment Overview
The objective of our experiment was to validate our approach to reducing complex system
models to computationally tractable formal state specifications through application of a
set of well-defined component archetypes. We determined success by whether we could run
formal analysis on the generated state model and that a result found for a success or error
discovery assertion in a SLICED model would also manifest in the Virtual ADAPT Simulink
model.
5 We did not include blocks related to fault injection in this count. Including fault injection brings the
total block count to 14705.
6 The top level block for this is the block named VirtualADAPT/VirtualADAPTv1
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Figure 5 ADAPT Components as Reduced for Analysis by SLICED.
6.2 Application of SLICED to ADAPT
Core ADAPT Components
Virtual ADAPT indentifies 97 of its high-level Simulink subsytems as "ADAPT Components,"
many of which have specified fault conditions. 7 These components fit into several categories:
batteries, inverters, load banks, loads, circuit breakers, relays, and sensors.
Aside from loadbanks and sensors, each component is taken to be a state machine with
its states and transitions straightforwardly deduced from each type’s well-defined fault modes
and inferred functionality. Additionally, this abstraction hides the detail associated with the
electrical power transer by describing component’s electric states with discrete notions of
power supply and consumption.
SLICED is concerned with behavioral interfaces. We identified 52 of the 602 “SubSystem”
blocks in the top 6 levels of Virtual ADAPT as having modelable behavioral interfaces (we
identified an additional 2 at the 7th level). We determined the applicablity of blocks via
inspection of their names and uses in ADAPT, for example by identifying any block of type
“SubSystem” with a name containing “battery” as behaving according to the Battery behavior
prototype.
Using the 52 identified blocks, we generated a NuSMV specification including definitions
of each of our re-usable component archetypes, as well as variables defining each of the 52
blocks according to their determined archetype. We implemented connections between the
blocks using additional variables internal to each type definition. Figure 5 shows all of these
components and their connections.
ADAPT provides connections describing both voltage and amperage on wires between
components. In creating the NuSMV representation we combined these connections into a
single “draw” connection representing a unitless measure of power consumption. As with our
7 https://github.com/nasa/VirtualADAPT/blob/master/MATLAB/ADAPTComponents.m
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other design abstractions, this choice results in a loss of fidelity but maintains the capacity
to reason about the system in terms of relative supply and demand.
6.3 Results
6.3.1 Performance Results
Test Platform
We ran our example analysis on a 64 bit Windows 10 laptop with 24GB of RAM and an Intel
i7 CPU running at 2.5 GHz. We used NuSMV version 2.6.0. We measured performance of
the NuSMV execution using the PowerShell Measure-Command cmdlet, as shown in Listing 4.
1 Measure−Command −Express ion { nusmv . \ ba t t e ry_repa i r_ fu l l . smv > out . txt }
Listing 4 Powershell Invocation Example.
We added a simple assertion to the state model, asserting that the draw on Battery1
would be less than one.
1 LTLSPEC G( Battery1 . draw < 1)
Listing 5 Simple Assertion for Performance Timing.
Nominal Analysis
Analysis of the generated FSM with no performance improvements applied was computation-
ally intractable, yielding no results after 12 hours.
Acutator Removal
We performed several analyses of reduced models, each time starting with the full SLICED-
generated model and applying a reduction or adaptation. First, we removed 12 actuators
and their assocated relays, as shown in Figure 6. Analysis of this model took 3 minutes 8
seconds.
Battery Subsystem Removal
Second, we removed Battery2 and all of the 2-prefixed components, as shown in Figure 7.
Analysis of this configuration took 8 minutes 34 seconds.
Smaller Actuator Removal
Third, we removed eight actuators and relays, as shown in Figure 8. Analysis of this
configuration took 5 hours 25 minutes 59 seconds.
Actuator Subsystem Collapse
As discussed in Subsubsection 4.1.1 we merged the relays and actuators in two subsystems
into abstractions representing only the possible power consumption of the subsystem (see
Figure 9). Analysis of this configuration took 26 minutes 51 seconds. This result is of
particular note because this reduction did not constitute a reduction in problem scope (as
did the other reductions), yet it made the overall problem computationally tractable.
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Figure 6 ADAPT Components as generated by SLICED, with 12 actuators and relays removed.
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Figure 7 ADAPT Components as generated by SLICED, with the battery2 system and actuators
removed.
This result will serve as a motivating factor for future research in performance-oriented
composition of FSM and model checking problem specification based on traditional engineer-
ing models.
6.4 Validation
6.4.1 Error Detection
As described in Subsection 4.2, we generate assertions on the model based on component
archetypes. For example, for breaker CircuitBreakerEY162 we generate an assertion that
CircuitBreakerEY162 will remain connected (a safety assertion), as shown in Listing 6.
1 LTLSPEC G( CircuitBreakerEY166 . s t a t e = connected )
Listing 6 Breaker 162 Draw Assertion.
The SLICED model was useful in fault determination. For example, it was discovered
that sufficient power draw through CircuitBreakerEY162 could cause it to trip and become
disconnected, as shown in the counter example in Listing 7.
1 -- specification G CircuitBreakerEY162.state = connected is false
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Figure 8 ADAPT Components as generated by SLICED, with the battery 1 subsystem actuators
and relays removed.
2 -- as demonstrated by the following execution sequence
3 Trace Desc r ip t i on : LTL Counterexample
4 Trace Type : Counterexample
5 −> State : 1 . 1 <−
6 CircuitBreakerEY162 . s t a t e = connected
7 CircuitBreakerEY162 . supplyingPower = TRUE
8 −> State : 1 . 2 <−
9 BankOne . draw = 11
10 CircuitBreakerEY162 . draw = 11
11 −> State : 1 . 3 <−
12 CircuitBreakerEY162 . s t a t e = broken
Listing 7 Counterexample to the Breaker Draw Assertion (subset of full NuSMV output).
Validation with Simulink
The Virtual ADAPT model is designed to allow user injection of error into the model. 8 The
objective of SLICED is to find errors in the design as specified (without injection of specific
errors), so to validate SLICED and Virtual ADAPT we manually introduced errors into the
Virtual ADAPT model specification (instead of injecting them at runtime).
We replicated the example detection of a circuit breaker tripping on excessive load by
changing an actuator’s parameters in Virtual ADAPT to increase its power consumption (as
described by the counterexample generated by NuSMV). Figure 10 shows a screenshot of
Simulink’s data viewer tracking the power draw from the actuator (ComputerPower:1) and
the state of the circuitbreaker (CircuitBreakerEY162:3). Note that the state of the circuit
breaker changes from connected (1) to disconnected (0) shortly after the increase in power
consumption from the actuator.
8 The ADAPT documentation uses the term “fault” however this paper uses definitions of “fault” and
“error” from Avizienis et al., who define “fault” as the hypothesized cause of an error [2].
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Figure 9 ADAPT Components with two banks of actuators merged into their effective represent-
ations.
6.4.2 Fault Mitigation
Methodology
To exercise SLICED as a mechanism for generating error correction plans with ADAPT,
we first used SLICED to generate a baseline ADAPT NuSMV specification, then removed
some components to make it computationally tractable (as described in Subsubsection 6.3.1).
Next, we manually modified that specificiation to set the initial state of a given component
to an error state, for example by initializing Battery2 as dead (shown in Listing 8).
1 MODULE BatteryStartDead ( output1 , output2 , capac i ty )
2 VAR
3 s t a t e : {nominal , dead , underRepair } ;
4 DEFINE
5 supplyingPower := ( s t a t e = nominal ) ;
6 draw := ( output1 . draw + output1 . draw ) ;
7 ASSIGN
8 in i t ( s t a t e ) := dead ;
9
10 next ( s t a t e ) := case
11 ( draw > capac i ty ) : dead ;
12 ( ( s t a t e = dead ) & (draw = 0) ) : underRepair ;
13 ( ( s t a t e = underRepair ) & (draw = 0) ) : nominal ;
14 TRUE : s t a t e ;
15 esac ;
Listing 8 Battery module with dead initialization specified in NuSMV
Next, we specified an assertion claiming that “there is no way to return the system to a
good state” such as the assertion in Listing 9.
1 -- NuSMV LTL assertion claiming that there is no future
2 -- state in which all of the listed
3 -- actuators are nominal and battery 1 is in a nominal state
4 -- with a power draw of two or less.
5 LTLSPEC G(
6 NEMO. s t a t e != nominal |
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Figure 10 Example of simulation Virtual ADAPT demonstrating a high power power draw
tripping CircuitBreakerEY162.
7 L1H . s t a t e != nominal |
8 DCLoadBox . s t a t e != nominal |
9 Load2G . s t a t e != nominal |
10 Battery1 . s t a t e != nominal |
11 Battery1 . draw > 2 )
Listing 9 Repair assertion for ADAPT
Finally, we ran NuSMV on the modified model. If a repair plan was possible, NuSMV
generated a sequence of steps that could be taken by the user (recall that user-actionable
operations are specified as non-deterministic in our model, so NuSMV can vary them at will
to generate plan).
We determined that our use of NuSMV discovered repair plans that were valid in the
context of the SLICED-generated FSM (that is, they were legal sequences of transitions),
but that our generated FSM did not facilitate constraints on the plan discovery so that other
desired system constraints are maintained throughout execution of the plan. This meant
that we could generate viable repair plans for simple problems (e.g., turn a switch back on),
but that attempts to generate multi-step plans were often met with technically valid but
practically infeasible results, such as rapidly switching relays on and off.
7 Conclusions
This paper described a methodology for generating FSM that formally describe the behavior
of components in a system model. As a case study, this paper used the NASA Virtual
ADAPT Simulink model as a data source from which to generate NuSMV specifications. We
evaluated the performance of NuSMV on our generated FSMs and replicated findings from
analysis of the FSM in Simulink.
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7.1 Results
We described a process for creation of an FSM by identifying component archetypes in the
source model, creating standardized state machines for each archetype, and assembling the
final FSM from component state machines.
Performance
We determined that naive generation of an FSM from components in the Virtual ADAPT
model yielded a state machine too large for brute force exploration. We determined that
further decomposition of the FSM into partial models enabled exploration.
Error Detection
We described a process for generating assertions about components in a generated FSM. We
demonstrated detection of a tripping circuit breaker, and replicated the trip in Simulink.
Repair Plan Generation
We determined that the level of fidelity and detail generated by SLICED is appropriate and
viable for generation of plans, but that the assertion language and counterexample capability
we evaluated with NuSMV were not ideal for plan generation because the FSM we generated
did not readily account system constraints when generating a plan.
Future Work
The results of our experiment demonstrated that a formal model of abstract components
derived from a high fidelity abstraction can provide results that are replicable in the source
conventional engineering model. However, further work is required to verify our claim
about the completeness of the SLICED methodology. In particular, the methodology for
translating Simulink blocks to NuSMV used in this experiment was based on heuristics.
stronger arguments about the correctness of the formal model will require rigorous translation.
Additional work should contribute toward improving the structure of generated models for
subsystem separation and on identifying solver optimization approaches to take advantage of
the generated models.
Additional work is also needed to refine the generation of repair plans from conventional
engineering models, either by exploring new methods of problem specification, by using
different analysis tools (e.g., different model checkers or dedicated planning tools), or both.
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